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Book Review
Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 406, $29.95.
Reviewed by S.I. Strong 
How Legal Academics Can Participate in Judicial Education:
A How-To Guide by Richard Posner
Introduction
The U.S. legal system has long been characterized as reflecting judicial 
rather than legislative supremacy.1 While this approach may seem paradoxical 
given the United States’ deep-seated commitment to democracy, most judges 
have traditionally been considered worthy of their role in society as a result 
of “[t]heir independence in office, and manner of appointment.”2 However, 
contemporary commentators now question whether these qualities are 
sufficient, given claims that “no selection method can guarantee the continued 
fitness of the judiciary.”3 Indeed, many judges “turn out to be ill-suited for 
the job,” despite having survived rigorous selection procedures.4 As a result, 
confidence in the judicial branch is on the decline.5  
1. See Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 Harv. L. rev. 1026, 1041 (1988); 
Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 
111 CoLum. L. rev. 1137, 1138-39 (2011); Martin H. Redish, Political Consensus, Constitutional 
Formulae, and the Rationale for Judicial Review, 88 miCH. L. rev. 1340, 1346 (1990) (book review).
2. JoHn marsHaLL, virginia ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in tHe founders’ 
Constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner ed., 1989), http://press-pubs.uchicago.
edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s26.html.
3. Wayne Doane, The Membership of Judges in Gender Discriminatory Clubs, 12 vt. L. rev. 459, 461 
(1987).
4. Keith R. Fisher, Education for Judicial Aspirants, 43 akron L. rev. 163, 164 (2010). Studies have 
also shown that unconstrained judicial independence can be disastrous. See Frank B. Cross, 
Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 oHio st. L.J. 195, 199-202 (2003).
5. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Original Sin and Judicial Independence:  Providing 
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The most common means of improving both professional performance 
and public perception of a particular group is through continuing education 
initiatives.6 However, significant questions arise as to whether a judge can or 
should be required to engage in any form of judicial education. At this point, 
most U.S. state and all federal judges7 are not currently under any obligation 
to engage in any particular form of judicial education before or after their 
elevation to the bench, despite the acknowledged severity of the learning 
curve for new judges8 and the significant changes to the nature of judging over 
the past few decades.9
At this point, very little is known about how someone learns to become 
a judge. Not only are judges often hesitant to discuss such matters, perhaps 
Accountability for Justices, 50 Wm. & mary L. rev. 1105, 1107 (2009). While commentators often 
claim that the judiciary has the highest confidence level of all three branches of government, 
when viewed in absolute terms, the actual numbers are actually not very encouraging. See, 
e.g., GBA Strategies, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters for the National 
Center for State Courts (Dec. 4, 2014),  http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/2014-State-of-State-Courts-Survey-12042014.ashx 
(noting that in November 2014, only fifty-seven percent of the public thought that courts 
were unbiased).  Political bias was the biggest concern of the survey population. See id.; 
see also GBA Strategies, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters for the National 
Center for State Courts (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx (noting 
that a majority of respondents saw courts as the venue of last resort and preferred alternative 
means of dispute resolution).
6. See Livingston armytage, eduCating Judges: toWards improving JustiCe—a survey of 
gLobaL praCtiCe 189, 217-27 (2d ed., 2015); ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, 
Preserving the Judiciary’s Institutional Legitimacy, 37 brief 54, 55 (2008); Neil Hamilton, Fostering 
Professional Formation (Professionalism):  Lessons From the Carnegie Foundation’s Five Studies on Educating 
Professionals, 45 CreigHton L. rev. 763, 766 (2012).
7. See CatHarine m. WHite & maureen e. Conner, issues and trends in JudiCiaL branCH 
eduCation 2005 App. 3D (2005) (reflecting information generated through the Judicial 
Education Reference Information & Technical Transfer Project (JERITT), which suggests 
that only forty percent of states require any form of judicial education); S.I. Strong, 
Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture:  Does the Current System of Educating Judges Promote a Well-
Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest? 2015 J. disp. resoL. 1, 3-4, 7, 19-21 (2015) 
[hereinafter Strong, Judicial Education]. Traditionally, most if not all incoming federal judges 
attend new judge orientation sessions offered by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), even 
though participation is purely voluntary. See The Hon. Jeremy Fogel & S.I. Strong, Judicial 
Education, Dispute Resolution and the Life of a Judge: A Conversation with Judge Jeremy Fogel, Director of the 
Federal Judicial Center, 2017 J. disp. resoL. (forthcoming) (reflecting the views of the current 
director of the FJC). Supreme Court justices do not participate in any of these programs. 
8. See WiLLiam domnarski, in tHe opinion of tHe Court 36 (1996); Emily Kadens, The Puzzle 
of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William de Grey, 75 brook. L. rev. 143, 143-44 (2009). 
9. Not only are disputes becoming more complex, but judges are also taking on additional 
duties, ranging from case management (leading to the rise of the “managerial” judge 
rather than the professional adjudicator) to alternative dispute resolution (as a result of the 
increased emphasis on settlement). See Fisher, supra note 4, at 164, 182-85; Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. rev. 374, 378 (1982).
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believing that reticence helps protect the mystique of the judiciary,10 but 
scholars of the judiciary have also neglected judicial education in favor of 
research on other issues such as judicial independence and appointment 
mechanisms.11 However, this situation may change as a result of Judge Richard 
Posner’s most recent book, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary.12  
The book touches on a number of important issues, but the most 
revolutionary element involves Judge Posner’s discussion of how the legal 
academy can assist with the education of current and future judges (2).13 As 
Section I of this review illustrates, matters relating to academic participation 
in judicial education are both contentious and underdeveloped as a matter of 
practice and scholarly inquiry, which makes Divergent Paths a welcome addition 
to the literature. However, simply raising an issue is often not enough to 
trigger change; instead, reformers must identify tangible and realistic plans 
to improve a particular field of endeavor. Section II therefore presents and 
analyzes Judge Posner’s proposals regarding the academy’s role in judicial 
education by comparing his ideas with best practices in the field. In so doing, 
this Review, I hope to promote increased debate about the nature and scope 
of judicial education in the United States and the ways that legal scholars can 
assist both the state and federal judiciaries. Section III concludes by tying the 
various strands of discussion together and identifying additional issues that 
need to be considered in the coming years.
I.  Judicial Education in the United States
For centuries, the concept of judicial education was somewhat paradoxical 
in the common-law world. Unlike civil law judges, who were (and continue 
to be) given specialized instruction from the very earliest days of their legal 
studies, common-law judges, including those in the United States, came to 
the bench only after distinguished careers at the bar and essentially “took the 
oath, stepped onto the bench, and proceeded to fill the judicial role as if born 
in the robe.”14 This approach, which is rooted in medieval English practice, 
10. See Kadens, supra note 8, at 143.
11. See id. at 145-46; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 6-11. This situation may be changing 
as a result of several recent initiatives relating to the study of judicial education. See, e.g., 
armytage, supra note 6, at xxvi (outlining recent developments); CHeryL tHomas, revieW of 
JudiCiaL training and eduCation in otHer JurisdiCtions 32-33 (May 2006) (constituting 
a worldwide report prepared for the British Judicial Studies Board), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
laws/socio-legal/docs/Review_of_Judicial_Train.pdf; Symposium, Judicial Education and the 
Art of Judging: From Myth to Methodology, 2015 J. disp. resoL. 1 (2015) (discussing a variety of 
recent initiatives).
12. riCHard a. posner, divergent patHs: tHe aCademy and tHe JudiCiary (2016).  
13. See also Michael C. Dorf, 65 J. LegaL eduC. 186 (2016) (book review); Richard Posner, 
Michael C. Dorf’s ‘Review’ of Richard A. Posner, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary–A 
Response by the Book’s Author, 65 J. LegaL eduC. 203 (2016). Judge Posner has discussed judicial 
education in the past, but only in passing. See riCHard a. posner, refLeCtions on Judging 
335-37, 347 (2013) [hereinafter posner, refLeCtions].  
14. Kadens, supra note 8, at 143-45; Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial 
Book Review: Divergent Paths
424 Journal of Legal Education
was based on the assumption that anyone who has become a senior litigator is 
sufficiently well-prepared to serve as a judge.15 
The traditional approach began to change in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
many common-law countries began to appreciate the difficulties judges face 
when transitioning from the bar to the bench.16 Some form of judicial education 
was deemed to be useful, and the United States revolutionized the field by 
creating an independent entity—the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) —with a 
statutory mission to provide research on and education to the U.S. federal 
judiciary.17 Over the years, a number of similar programs have developed 
around the world.18
As momentous as these changes may be, the current system reflects a 
number of problems.19 Perhaps the most concerning issue involves the almost 
total control exerted by the judiciary over the scope, content, and method of 
judicial education in the United States.20 This approach has traditionally been 
justified on the twin claims of expertise (i.e., the belief that only judges can 
appreciate the particular pressures and demands of acting as judges and thus 
are the only persons qualified to act as instructors) and judicial independence.21 
However, commentators now question whether the existing approach provides 
judges with too much control and operates as a type of regulatory capture.22  
Several common-law countries (most notably Australia, Canada and 
England) have attempted to counter the problems associated with excessive 
judicial control over judicial education by increasing the role that legal 
academics play in the development and delivery of educational programs for 
judges.23 In particular, these countries have noted the need for academics to be 
Design as the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 ind. J. gLobaL LegaL stud. 139, 143 (2004).  
15. See Kadens, supra note 8, at 144.  
16. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 3.
17. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2016); federaL JudiCiaL Center, http://www.fjc.gov [hereinafter 
FJC website].
18. See armytage, supra note 6, at 13-15. One well-known program is the National Judicial 
College, which provides educational programming to U.S. state court judges. See nationaL 
JudiCiaL CoLLege, http://www.judges.org/. The field has further diversified to include 
private, for-profit programs for state, federal, and foreign judges. See armytage, supra note 6, 
at 13-15.
19. See armytage, supra note 6, at 15; tHomas, supra note 11, at 108-14; Strong, Judicial Education, 
supra note 7, at 3.
20. See armytage, supra note 6, at xxx, xlix; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 4. 
21. See tHomas, supra note 11, at 32-33; ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra 
note 6, at 56; J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Education and Training in Asia and the Pacific, 21 miCH. J. 
int’L L. 849, 858-59 (2000). 
22. See Livingston Armytage, Educating Judges:  Where to from Here?  2015 J. disp. resoL. 167 (2015), 
172-73; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 4.
23. See Armytage, supra note 22, at 172-73. For example, Canada, one of the rising stars of the 
field, has adopted a “three pillar” approach to judicial education that considers input from 
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involved not only in developing materials relating to the substantive law but 
also in creating content relating to what has been referred to as “judge craft” 
(i.e., the skills specifically associated with judging).24  
In many ways, the proposals made by Judge Posner in Divergent Paths 
concerning possible ways that the U.S. legal academy can assist the judiciary 
mirror best practices in the field of judicial education (2). However, a number 
of issues merit further attention and development.
II.  Judge Posner and Judicial Education 
Judge Posner claims that the modern judiciary faces three types of problems. 
First are structural concerns relating to “the uneven quality of federal judicial 
appointments at all levels, excessive delay in filling federal judicial vacancies 
. . . , the poor draftsmanship of so many federal statutes, the indeterminacy of 
much American law . . . , certain salary anomalies, and excessive expenditures 
on federal courthouses” (59-60).25 While many of these matters are beyond 
the direct influence of the legal academy, scholars can nonetheless assist with 
them. For example, Judge Posner says that academics can do a better job 
in helping judges appreciate how uncertain U.S. law is, since judges appear 
unaware of that issue (350). 
Second are process-oriented concerns involving “how federal judges decide 
cases and justify their decisions in judicial opinions” (76). Judge Posner lists 
seventeen different items that would benefit from academic attention: legal 
formalism, the “rearview mirror syndrome,” a naïveté regarding statutory 
interpretation and precedents, excessive use of multifactor tests, the “fetishism 
of words,” lack of appreciation for context, passivity (i.e., the tendency to 
act merely as an umpire), lack of willingness to change (i.e., professional 
conservativism), “complacency and overconfidence,” formulaic decision-
making, informational challenges, the inability to conduct independent 
judicial research, absence of self-knowledge, “a loose attitude toward truth,” 
a dedication to “the noble lie,” the restrictions of a generalist judiciary, and a 
shortage of diversity (76-192).
Third are managerial concerns (222). Here, Judge Posner lists ten different 
issues: management of judicial staff, the absence of collegiality, problems 
in macromanagement, managing the system as a whole, judicial work ethic, 
judges, academics, and the community. See nationaL JudiCiaL institute (Can.), https://
www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/judicial-education/the-nji-s-judicial-education-portfolio/; see also 
tHomas, supra note 11, at 50.
24. See tHomas, supra note 11, at 13-17 (noting such skills include matters such as opinion writing, 
sentencing and dealing with particular types of litigants and evidence); nationaL JudiCiaL 
institute (Can.), supra note 23 (including a course calendar that discusses the “craft of 
judging,” including judge craft, court craft and professional craft). The FJC has also begun 
to develop this type of programming. See Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.
25. See also James B. Eaglin & Matthew Alex Ward, Enhancing the Administration of Justice and 
Strengthening Judicial Independence Through Independent, Judicial-Based Applied Research Centers, 7 J. 
LegaL teCH. risk mgmt. 77, 78-79 (2014).  
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foot-dragging, aging on the bench, excessive travel, workload issues, and 
congressional oversight (222-58).
Although these challenges are extremely wide-ranging, Judge Posner has 
identified a variety of ways in which the academy can help the judiciary improve 
its performance. His plan includes three separate types of initiatives:  those 
involving legal scholarship (261-96), those involving the law school curriculum 
(297-344), and those involving academic participation in continuing judicial 
education (345-60).
A.  Improvements Involving Legal Scholarship
Judge Posner has criticized contemporary legal scholarship on a number of 
previous occasions, claiming that much of the jargon-filled, interdisciplinary 
research that is currently in vogue provides little help to judges, even if that 
style of writing reflects the fastest route to academic publication and promotion 
(291).26 In Divergent Paths, he provides a more nuanced discussion of why that 
type of scholarship is so unhelpful, despite the apparent focus on matters of 
deep doctrinal importance. First, Judge Posner says that many academics 
offer patently unworkable solutions to various legal challenges (266, 284). As 
a result, the professoriate should not be surprised when their work is ignored 
by the judiciary. Second, he says that academics focus nearly exclusively on 
issues relating to “the Supreme Court—the court least likely to pay attention 
to academic critique” —even though other courts have in many ways a much 
greater effect on both law and society (2).
Judge Posner’s solution is relatively simple: He would “like to see a shift 
in academic emphasis from critique of particular decisions and doctrines to 
critique of particular judges, and of judging, below the level of the Supreme 
Court” (266).27 He also suggests increasing the frequency and diversity of 
empirical studies, using data that is readily available from the FJC or the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (275).28
Given his longstanding interest in judicial reasoning, it is not surprising that 
Judge Posner makes particular mention of the need for more robust analysis 
of the “structure of judicial opinions (as distinct from their content)” on both 
an individual and systemic level (269). He would also like to see increased 
academic discussion of how to write a good judicial opinion (270)29 and the 
26. See also Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 Harv. L. rev. 1314, 1320 (2002); 
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 miCH. L. rev. 
1921, 1927 (1993). Similar complaints have been voiced by other judges, most notably 
Chief Justice Roberts. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice 
Disses Legal Scholarship, ABA J. (July 7, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
law_prof_responds_after_chief_justice_roberts_disses_legal_scholarship/.
27. Posner notes that this analysis would need to be systemic to be effective.
28. The FJC routinely provides assistance to academics working on judicial research.  See Fogel 
& Strong, supra note 7. 
29. Some work has been done in this regard. See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: 
A Guide for Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. disp. resoL. 93 (2015) [hereinafter 
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effect of certain psychological or sociological phenomenon (such as implicit, 
hindsight or status quo bias) on judicial decision-making (273).30 
Perhaps the most provocative of Judge Posner’s proposals involves a call 
for an increase in “collaborative research between law professors and judges” 
(262), which he says would produce scholarship that is more responsive to 
judges’ needs and concerns (285). Divergent Paths provides several tangible 
examples of how Judge Posner has himself facilitated such research, which 
may give academics some ideas on how to proceed in this regard (286-95).  
Though useful in its way, Judge Posner’s advice has its limits, particularly 
for scholars who do not personally know any like-minded judges.31  Fortunately, 
there are a number of existing initiatives that would facilitate increased 
collaboration between the academy and the judiciary, although Judge Posner 
does not mention them by name.32 The most notable of these programs is 
the U.S. Supreme Court Fellowship, which provides midcareer and junior 
professionals with a unique opportunity to study the workings of the federal 
judiciary at the highest level.33 Supreme Court Fellows work closely with the 
FJC, the Administrative Office, the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the 
Office of the Counselor to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and develop 
precisely the type of collaborative relationships that Judge Posner says are 
critical to the production of useful legal scholarship (275).34 Chief Justice 
John Roberts recently adopted a number of innovations meant to increase the 
scholarly nature of the program and lay the groundwork for more practical 
scholarship concerning the judiciary,35 and those efforts have already met with 
success.36
Strong, Judicial Opinions].
30. Some work has been done in this regard. See Judge Jeremy d. fogeL, mindfuLness and 
Judging (2016), http://www.fjc.gov; Kathleen Mahoney, Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, 
2015 J. disp. resoL. 43, 62 (2015) (discussing concerns about implicit or unconscious bias).
31. Judge Posner admits that it can be difficult to establish the necessary relationships. See id. at 
287-88.
32. See, e.g., JudiCiaL branCH of CaLifornia, Judicial Administration Fellowship, http://www.courts.
ca.gov/judicialfellowship.htm; nationaL Center for state Courts, ICM Fellows, http://
www.ncsc.org/Education-and-Careers/ICM-Fellows/Fellow-Speech.aspx.
33. See Jon B. Gould et al., Courting Success: The Supreme Court Fellows Program at 35, 41 ps: poL. sCi. & 
poLs. 839 (2008); S.I. Strong, The U.S. Supreme Court Fellows Program:  The Opportunity of a Lifetime, 
53 Judges’ J. 27, 27-31 (2014) [hereinafter Strong, Supreme Court Fellows].  
34. See also Strong, Supreme Court Fellows, supra note 33, at 30-31.
35. See Strong, Supreme Court Fellows, supra note 33, at 30-31.
36. See, e.g., ira p. robbins, JudiCiaL sabbatiCaLs (1987), http://www.fjc.gov (written while the 
author was a Supreme Court Fellow based at the FJC); Eaglin & Ward, supra note 25, at 
77 (reflecting an article co-authored by the director of the FJC’s Research Division and a 
former Supreme Court Fellow); Jennifer A. Segal, The Role of Family Ties Departures in Federal 
Sentencing, 13 fed. sentenCing rep. 258 (2001) (written while the author was Supreme Court 
Fellow based at the Sentencing Commission); Strong, Supreme Court Fellows, supra note 33, at 
30 (discussing a symposium on judicial education undertaken by a former Supreme Court 
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Another means of facilitating cooperative research between judges and 
academics is through the creation of independent applied research centers 
focusing on matters relating to the judiciary.37 A recent study identified 478 such 
entities around the world.38 Scholars interested in conducting collaborative 
research of the type proposed by Judge Posner could easily contact one or 
more of these organizations to propose projects of mutual interest (275).39 
B.  Improvements Involving the Law School Curriculum
After discussing various improvements to legal scholarship, Divergent Paths 
considers how to enhance the law school curriculum (297-344). Although 
Judge Posner recognizes that only a very small number of law students will ever 
find themselves sitting on the bench, he nevertheless says that law schools can 
provide a distinct service to the judiciary by better preparing future advocates 
(333) and law clerks.40 Unsurprisingly, given his earlier writings, Judge Posner 
says the best way to do so is to reduce the role of legal formalism in law school 
and increase the emphasis on legal pragmatism (305, 322).41 
Divergent Paths contains four major proposals in this regard. The first focuses 
on how substantive courses are taught and suggests that professors alter 
both their lecture style and the type of materials used in class (305-07).42 For 
example, rather than relying on heavily edited casebooks, Judge Posner advises 
professors to circulate cases in their original, unedited form along with a series 
of questions that are to be considered by the students before coming to class 
(306-07). As radical as this proposal may seem, this method has been used with 
great success at two of the world’s most renowned universities, the University of 
Oxford and the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom.43 Not only 
Fellow based at the FJC); see also supreme Court feLLoWs aLumni assoCiation, http://
scfellowsalumni.squarespace.com/ (including a full list of alumni publications). 
37. See Eaglin & Ward, supra note 25, at 77.   
38. See id. at Appx.
39. Both U.S. and foreign entities are listed.
40. As Judge Posner notes, many law clerks write the first draft of various legal decisions and 
opinions, which has an enormous effect on the style and content of those rulings. See id. at 
334, 351; Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 98, 111-12. 
41. Formalism requires readers to “fit legal doctrine . . . to every new case.” Id. at 305; see also 
id. at 317 (discussing the problems of formalism). Judge Posner has long considered legal 
formalism to be problematic. See posner, refLeCtions, supra note 13, at 110-11; Richard 
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case 
W. res. L. rev. 179, 179-217 (1986). 
42. The rationale is that the heavy editing of contemporary casebooks emphasizes doctrine 
over facts, thereby giving students an unrealistic view of the judicial process and judicial 
decision-making. See id. at 307.  
43. See times HigHer eduCation, World Reputation Rankings, https://www.timeshighereducation.
com/world-university-rankings/2015/reputation-ranking#!/page/0/length/25 (listing 
Cambridge as number two and Oxford as number three in the world); 
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has this approach proved capable of producing exemplary legal thinkers,44 it 
also reduces the cost of legal education by eliminating the need for expensive 
casebooks (306). Furthermore, the basic methodology can be easily adapted 
for use in U.S. law schools.45
Judge Posner’s second proposal concerns the type of courses offered in 
the standard law school curriculum and includes a desire to see an increased 
emphasis on how judicial decisions and opinions are written (305, 334-35). 
Although such courses provide an immediate and obvious benefit to students 
who work as judicial clerks after graduation, these types of classes also offer 
non-clerks important insights into how chambers operate (307-11).
Several of Judge Posner’s suggestions on how to conduct such courses 
contradict conventional wisdom about best practices in legal and judicial 
writing and should be considered carefully before they are adopted.46 However, 
other ideas, particularly the suggestion that law students be deliberately 
exposed to excellence in judicial and other types of writing, hold great merit 
(307-11).47 While Divergent Paths lists some of Judge Posner’s favorite judicial 
authors (337), other resources are available. For example, the Green Bag Almanac 
& Reader provides a list of the best legal writing produced in the United States 
each year.48
Another curricular proposal involves reducing “the headlock that adversary 
procedure has on the American legal profession,” which Judge Posner says 
produces judges who are unnecessarily bound by formalist concerns and 
practices (318).49 Instead, he says that the academy should adopt teaching 
techniques that seek “to persuade judges to broaden their intellectual horizons, 
to innovate, to understand the breadth of their discretion and exercise it 
44. See Joe Hall, The World’s Best Universities for Law, City a.m. (May 21, 2015), http://www.cityam.
com/216197/worlds-best-universities-law-cambridge-and-oxford-trump-uk-competition 
(noting the law program at Cambridge is ranked number two in the world and Oxford is 
number three).  
45. See university of oxford, Oxford Learning Institute, https://www.learning.ox.ac.uk/support/
teaching/resources/teaching/ (describing the tutorial system); see also WiLLiams CoLLege, 
Tutorials, http://www.williams.edu/academics/tutorials/ (noting the adaption of the 
Oxbridge system for U.S. undergraduates at one of the country’s top colleges). The current 
author taught law at both the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge and 
has adapted many of those teaching techniques for use in U.S. law schools.
46. For example, Judge Posner is adamantly against the use of headers, although numerous 
experts on writing believe that headers improve readers’ comprehension. Compare id. at 315 
with Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 117.
47. Interestingly, the students did not agree with Judge Posner about what constituted a model 
opinion. See posner, supra note 12, at 307-11.  
48. tHe green bag aLmanaC & reader, Exemplary Legal Writing, http://www.greenbag.org/
green_bag_press/almanacs/almanacs.html; see also domnarski, supra note 8, at 97-98. 
49. The director of the FJC has also criticized this phenomenon and discussed ways of 
addressing the issue. See Fogel & Strong, supra note 7 (suggesting increased exposure to 
alternative means of dispute resolution early in the law school curriculum).
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imaginatively” (282).50 As an example of this type of imaginative discretion, 
Judge Posner suggests that judges be encouraged to conduct their own legal 
or factual research in appropriate cases (318). While some observers may 
oppose independent judicial research,51 Judge Posner defends his position on 
the grounds that (1) civil law legal systems grant judges significant discretion 
in directing and participating in the development of relevant evidence (318), 
and (2) “the adversary system is not enthroned in the Constitution and is 
riddled with exceptions”(369). Interestingly, this discussion could be read 
as suggesting that Judge Posner would support an increased emphasis on 
comparative law in the law school curriculum, both as a standalone course 
and as an element of other substantive courses. Other courses that he supports 
include those “in finance, accounting, business management, computer 
science . . . , statistics . . . , economics, psychology, political science, medicine 
and biology, fingerprint and DNA evidence, electronic surveillance, and the 
patent system” (325).52
The third major proposal in this section of Divergent Paths involves a call to 
increase the number of clinical professors on law school faculties (323, 342). 
Although other experts have made similar suggestions in the past,53 Judge 
Posner goes further, suggesting that “[c]linical education deserves emphasis 
not merely as a supplement to conventional law courses but also as a substitute 
for some of them” (323). In making this recommendation, Judge Posner is 
speaking from experience, having taught various simulation courses at the 
University of Chicago Law School, including an innovative class that used 
students as judges in mock trial simulations (323, 330). This latter approach 
is extremely educational, says Judge Posner, since “lawyers don’t learn a great 
deal about judges from appearing before them” (324). 
In many ways, this aspect of Divergent Paths correlates directly to certain 
reforms recently adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) regarding the 
U.S. law school curriculum (383-84).54  According to the new ABA protocols, 
50. See also fogeL, supra note 30; Chad M. Oldfather, Of Judges, Law, and the River:  Tacit Knowledge 
and the Judicial Role, 2015 J. disp. resoL. 155, 158 (2015) (noting that “good judging necessarily 
entails drawing on another sort of unconscious influence—in this case, one that we want to 
celebrate and cultivate”). 
51.  See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 duke L.J. 1263, 1267 
(2007) (stating the rules governing independent [factual] research are astonishingly unclear” 
and noting the bench is sharply divided as to what the best course of action is); see also 
United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing independent judicial research 
on the Internet).  Independent legal research is considered less problematic. See Hampton 
v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2002); Camacho v. Trimble Irrevocable Trust, 756 
N.W.2d 596, 298-99 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2008); Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 108. 
52. Posner notes that such courses could be offered at the undergraduate level or through 
massive open online courses (MOOCs).
53. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, 92 denv. u. L. rev. 1, 13-18 (2014) 
(discussing the 1992 MacCrate Report and the 2007 Carnegie Foundation report). 
54. See ABA, Accreditation Overview, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/
resources/accreditation.html; Report and Recommendations, American Bar Association, 
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students must now take six credit hours of clinical, experiential, or skills-related 
courses before graduation.55 This requirement not only conforms to Judge 
Posner’s views about how to educate law students, it also corresponds to best 
practices in judicial and adult education, which advocate experiential learning 
whenever possible.56 Interestingly, Judge Posner’s students were somewhat 
disappointed in his simulation course on the grounds that it “slighted legal 
doctrine,” which raises questions about how students will respond to the new 
ABA requirement about experiential coursework (323).57  
The ABA also now requires law schools to formalize the process of 
identifying and developing learning outcomes and assessment methods on 
both individual and institutional levels.58 Judge Posner strongly favors this 
process, claiming that it would be “highly desirable” for law schools “to decide 
what every student should know about judges by the time of graduation and 
how they should acquire that knowledge” (343). Not only would this approach 
increase the number of advocates who truly understand what judges need 
(343), it would also help the faculty who teach these types of courses learn 
more about judges, thereby helping to narrow the separation between the 
judiciary and the academy (343-44).
The book’s final recommendation for law schools involves the relationship 
between the faculty and the bastions of student autonomy: law review and moot 
court (340). While some of Judge Posner’s proposals (such as the suggestion 
that law students sit as moot court judges) may be well-received as a means of 
empowering students (340), other suggestions (such as the notion that faculty, 
rather than students, should administer law reviews and moot court programs) 
may be more controversial, even though the proposals are premised on the 
notion that increasing the role of the faculty in law reviews and moot court will 
improve the educational value of both endeavors (340-41).59
C.  Improvements Involving Continuing Judicial Education
The final section of Divergent Paths focuses on how academics can become 
involved with continuing judicial education for sitting judges (345-85). 
Task Force on the Future of Legal Education (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/taskforceonthefuturelegaleducation.html.
55. See am. bar ass’n, standards and ruLes of proCedure for approvaL of LaW sCHooLs 
2015-2016, Standards 301-05 [hereinafter ABA Standards].
56. See armytage, supra note 6, at 152-62; S. Brettel Dawson, Judicial Education: Pedagogy for Change, 
2015 J. disp. resoL. 175, 175 (2015); Fogel & Strong, supra note 7 (discussing courses at the 
FJC).
57. Notably, this confirms Judge Posner’s belief that law students are natural formalists. See id. at 
307, 316.
58. See ABA Standards, supra note 55, Standards 301-02, 314-15.
59. Students would still participate in both programs, but under increased faculty oversight.  See 
id. 
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Although other experts have also raised this issue,60 the tangible nature of 
Judge Posner’s proposals and the esteem with which he is held in both judicial 
and academic circles could generate real change in this regard.
Perhaps the most useful aspect of Judge Posner’s discussion involves the 
way in which he distinguishes between courses relating to the substance of 
the law and courses relating to judging and the judicial process (346). As 
important and prevalent as the former type of instruction is, Judge Posner 
says that such courses are often unnecessary, given that judges usually receive 
sufficient briefing from the parties on relevant points of procedural and 
substantive law (346). As a result, Judge Posner says that the primary need for 
judicial education is “in judging rather than doctrine” (351). Experts in judicial 
education often use the term “judge craft” to describe the skills specifically 
associated with judging.61  
Divergent Paths is therefore consistent with a number of best practices in the 
area of judicial education, particularly with respect to the way in which the 
text calls for educational programming on matters ranging from the natural 
and social sciences (which would help judges apply legal doctrine in an 
appropriate manner) (351) 62 to criminology (which would lead to an improved 
understanding of matters relating to recidivism) (348) and judicial writing 
(350-51).63 However, the book is somewhat more polemical when it calls for 
courses concerning the details of the legislative process (which Judge Posner 
says would help with statutory interpretation) and psychological factors (such 
as implicit, hindsight and cognitive bias) that can affect decision-making 
or that involve judicial “self-deception” (350).64 Some of the types of self-
deception that bother Judge Posner the most involve the idea that the law is 
clearly ascertainable and that judges can and do apply the law to the facts free 
of any external or preexisting influences (351). He also claims that many judges 
exaggerate their ability to maintain control of decision-making when opinions 
are initially drafted by law clerks (351).
The difficulty here is not with the content of the proposed coursework, 
since experts in judicial education have supported this type of programming 
60. See, e.g., tHomas, supra note 11, at 50; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 17; nationaL 
JudiCiaL institute (Can.), supra note 23 (discussing the “three-pillar” approach).
61. See tHomas, supra note 11, at 13-17 (noting such skills include matters such as opinion-writing, 
sentencing and dealing with particular types of litigants and evidence); nationaL JudiCiaL 
institute (Can.), supra note 23 (including a course calendar that discusses the “craft of 
judging,” including judge craft, court craft and professional craft).
62. This suggestion has been echoed by other judges. See Fogel & Strong, supra note 7; Chief 
Justice Mary R. Russell, Toward a New Paradigm of Judicial Education, 2015 J. disp. resoL. 79, 
80-86 (2015). 
63. There is some recent scholarship on this issue. See Strong, Judicial Opinions, supra note 29, at 
93-128.
64. The FJC has sought to address this issue. See fogeL, supra note 30.
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for years.65 Instead, the primary problem is that most judges cannot currently 
be compelled to attend any form of continuing judicial education, let alone 
programs on a particular subject.66 Judges are also extremely sensitive to 
any suggestion that they are affected by “priors,” despite overwhelming 
psychological and sociological evidence that every human being is subject to 
such influences (352).67 As a result, Judge Posner correctly notes  that those 
judges who are most in need of this type of programming will not enroll in 
the necessary courses of their own accord (359).68 Furthermore, this kind of 
coursework is especially necessary because judges were not exposed to these 
issues while in law school (351). 
Although he admits that the inability to compel attendance is problematic, 
Judge Posner concludes that that he has no answer to that particular issue (359). 
To some extent, this type of reticence is understandable, since it allows him 
to avoid the “vexed question” of mandatory judicial education.69 Numerous 
judges oppose such measures as “insulting,” and it may be that Judge Posner 
counts himself among that number.70 However, given the extensive research 
regarding the effectiveness and importance of judicial education71 and Judge 
Posner’s own views about the problems with judicial performance and 
preparation,72 the absence of any detailed discussion about the possibility of 
mandatory judicial education is disappointing. Such a discussion could have 
proceeded on pragmatic grounds (Judge Posner’s preferred methodology) 
and focused on whether mandatory judicial education would be likely to 
resolve the problems currently facing the U.S. judiciary;73 Judge Posner also 
could have taken a more theoretical turn and considered whether the current 
65. See armytage, supra note 6, at 166-73. 
66. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
67. See also riCHard a. posner, HoW Judges tHink 65-66 (2008) (defining the term “prior” as 
“prior probability,” meaning a judge’s predisposition to view a set of facts in a particular 
manner); Oldfather, supra note 50, at 157 (noting the challenge for judges “stems from the 
need to give play to some unconscious influences but not others, and . . . is complicated 
by the fact that the line between legitimate and illegitimate influences is both blurry and 
contestable”).
68. See also Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 15 (describing the likelihood of such an 
outcome).  
69. See Lynn HeCHt sCHafran, direCtor of tHe nationaL JudiCiaL eduCation program, 
testimony to tHe aba Joint Commission to evaLuate tHe modeL Code of JudiCiaL 
ConduCt 15 (Apr. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
judicialethics/resources/Comm_Code_HechtSchafran_0504ddt.authcheckdam.pdf.
70. Id. 
71. See armytage, supra note 6, at 24-41; ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra 
note 6, at 55; Hamilton, supra note 6, at 766. 
72. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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system of judicial education constitutes a form of regulatory capture.74 Either 
approach would have provided important insights into what is becoming an 
increasingly contentious issue.75  
Concerns about judicial self-regulation have become so pressing that some 
people have called for the appointment of an Inspector General with powers 
over the judiciary.76  Compared with that initiative, reshaping the U.S. approach 
to judicial education appears far less problematic from both theoretical and 
doctrinal perspectives.77 However, both propositions have been opposed by 
the judiciary on similar grounds, namely that such measures hinder judicial 
independence.78 While a detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope 
of this Review, concerns about judicial independence appear unwarranted 
in cases involving judicial education, given that judges are supposed to be 
eminently capable of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant material.79 
Furthermore, nothing appears objectionable about educational measures that 
provide judges with information necessary to make decisions.80 As a result, it 
would be very illuminating to hear Judge Posner’s perspective on this debate, 
particularly given his views on judicial discretion (318)81 and his respect for 
civil law legal traditions, which feature a much more rigorous approach to 
judicial education (318).82 
Although Divergent Paths fails to address questions relating to mandatory 
forms of judicial education, Judge Posner nevertheless offers a variety of useful 
ideas on how law schools can help provide the judiciary with appropriate 
educational offerings, should judges wish to partake in such courses. For 
74. See Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always Be 
Entrusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 ky. L. J. 439, 443 (2008-2009); 
Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 5-6; see also In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference 
Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 117 (U.S. 
Jud. Conference Comm. 2006) (Winter, J., dissenting) (“A self-regulatory procedure suffers 
from the weaknesses that many observers will be suspicious that complainants against judges 
will be disfavored. The Committee’s decision in this case can only fuel such suspicion.”).
75. See In re Opinion of the Judicial Conference Committee, 449 F.3d at 117 (Winter, J., dissenting); The 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Comm., Implementation of the Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 178 (2006); Bazelon, 
supra note 74, at 443; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 5, at 1139-40; Strong, Judicial Education, 
supra note 7, at 5-6.
76. See Bazelon, supra note 74, at 443. 
77. See id. (discussing constitutional concerns); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 10-11.
78. See The Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 n.y.u. L. rev. 
779, 789-97 (2015); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 10-11.
79. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 11.
80. See Dawson, supra note 56, at 179; Eaglin & Ward, supra note 25, at 107; Fogel & Strong, 
supra note 7; Judge R.L. Young, Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference, 45 fed. LaW. 40, 44 
(Nov./Dec. 1998).
81. See also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
82. See also Kadens, supra note 8, at 143-45; Koch, supra note 14, at 143.  
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example, he suggests that law schools can help judges overcome problems 
relating to self-management, management of staff members and management 
of the courtroom through narrowly tailored coursework on these issues (350, 
356-57).83 He says he considers these types of classes particularly important 
given the scarcity of scholarship on such matters (277, 287).84
Divergent Paths also provides helpful advice regarding the form of judicial 
programming.85  Thus, Judge Posner suggests offering short, intensive courses 
to respect the demands of judicial dockets and advocates reliance on faculty 
from other fields, such as management, psychology or sociology, to provide 
information on matters falling outside the competence of law professors 
(351-52). A number of these recommendations conform to best practices in 
the field.86 However, Judge Posner does not address a number of important 
considerations, such as those relating to budget shortfalls, even though those 
measures are having a significant effect on judicial education throughout the 
country.87
Some critics might suggest that law schools need not become involved in 
continuing judicial education because the field is already saturated.88 However, 
Judge Posner recognizes that many existing programs are limited in scope or 
operate under certain restrictions that make educational innovation difficult 
(357-59).89 Consequently, law schools may be able to fill a gap left by some of 
the more well-established institutions (358).90
III.  Conclusion
Divergent Paths is a remarkable book that provides a welcome introduction 
to the important and often overlooked issue of judicial education.91 The text 
83. Notably, judicial education centers such as the FJC are already offering a number of 
management and process-type issues, although Judge Posner discounts these courses (357-
59); Fogel & Strong, supra note 7; FJC Website, supra note 17.
84. Judge Posner generally supports self-education, but notes that such efforts may be unavailing 
if there are insufficient materials (360).  
85. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 21.
86. Experts in judicial education draw on research in adult education to identify the best means 
of delivering educational content to judges. See armytage, supra note 6, at 111-38 (discussing 
how andragogy differs from pedagogy); Dawson, supra note 56, at 189; Fogel & Strong, supra 
note 7. For example, judges are known to benefit more from experiential coursework than 
lectures. See sCHafran, supra note 69, at 1072 n. 52.
87. See armytage, supra note 6, at xxix; Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.
88. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (describing federal, state, and private forms of 
judicial education).
89. The FJC has adopted a number of innovations in recent years that address some of Judge 
Posner’s concerns. See id.; Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.
90. Fogel & Strong, supra note 7.
91. See Kadens, supra note 8, at 143-44.
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not only identifies topics on which more judicial education is needed,92 it also 
offers a wide range of ideas on how legal academics can help judges overcome 
certain ongoing challenges (361-68). However, some areas could be improved 
upon.93
The first issue involves the way Judge Posner limits his analysis to those 
institutions with which he is most familiar (i.e., the federal judiciary and elite 
law schools) (xii). Although this technique demonstrates a laudable humility, 
many of the issues discussed in Divergent Paths are as relevant to state court 
judges and the law schools from which those judges come as they are to federal 
judges and elite law schools.94 Furthermore, Divergent Paths contains important 
implications for the significant number of U.S. judges who have no legal 
training whatsoever.95  
Second, significant questions have been raised about the propriety of 
judicial education programs offered by certain private interest groups, 
including programs based at various law schools.96 Commentators have 
suggested that these types of programs may become more popular given the 
funding problems faced by many judicial systems,97 and it would be helpful to 
have Judge Posner’s views on this particular practice. Indeed, this is an issue 
that could be usefully subjected to an economic analysis considering hidden 
costs, negative externalities, and public goods associated with public versus 
private forms of judicial education.
92. Needs assessments are critical in judicial education. See armytage, supra note 6, at 69-
107 (discussing pros and cons of needs assessments as well as various methodologies); see 
also european JudiCiaL training netWork, Good Judicial Training Practices, http://www.
ejtn.eu/Resources/Good-judicial-training-practices/ (containing various types of needs 
assessments). However, one cannot rely exclusively on self-assessment to determine 
educational needs and goals. See Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Surveying Difficult Populations:  Lessons 
Learned from a National Survey of State Trial Court Judges, 22 Just. system J. 287, 288 (2001).
93. Recent scholarship in this area of law has identified a number of critical concerns that were 
not addressed by Judge Posner. See tHomas, supra note 11, at 108-14; Strong, Judicial Education, 
supra note 7, at 8-21.
94. Many state court judges attend public or so-called non-elite law schools.  For example, of the 
seven current Missouri State Supreme Court judges, four graduated from law school at the 
University of Missouri, one from Howard, one from Georgetown and one from Washington 
University in St. Louis. See missouri Courts, Supreme Court Judges, https://www.courts.
mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133.
95. See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 3 
(noting that in many states, lower-court judges have not attended law school and may not 
have completed college). 
96. See Chris Young, Reity O’Brien & Andrea Fuller, Corporations, Pro-Business Nonprofits Foot Bill 
for Judicial Seminars, Center for pubLiC integrity (May 27, 2014, 6:00AM), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/12368/corporations-pro-business-nonprofits-foot-bill-
judicial-seminars; Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should 
Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 fordHam urb. L.J. 941, 
941-44 (2002); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 11.  
97. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 11.  
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 Another issue that might benefit from an economic or similar analysis 
involves the question of whether judicial selection procedures can or do result 
in a well-functioning and well-informed judiciary. Judicial selection has long 
been considered a proxy for judicial competence, but the rationality of that 
assumption has never been established, empirically or theoretically.98
Finally, more discussion is needed regarding the proper role and function of 
judges.99  Judge Posner considers this issue to some extent in his discussion of 
legal formalism (305, 317, 322) and his analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ claim 
that a judge is meant to act solely as an “umpire” (318).100  However, Judge 
Posner does not discuss how differing views of what it means to be a judge can 
or should be taken into account by providers of judicial education.101 While 
he may believe that questions of the judicial role should not be addressed in 
educational programming because of concerns about judicial independence, 
it is difficult if not impossible to construct an appropriate curriculum without 
at least some appreciation of what it is that judges are meant to do.102
These are just a few of the issues that Judge Posner and other scholars of 
the judiciary will hopefully address in the future. However, scholarship is not 
the only way to advance the discussion regarding judicial education (361-68). 
For example, one of Judge Posner’s hopes is for increased interaction among 
the judiciary, the academy, and the bar (360).103 Although the American Legal 
Institute (ALI) was originally created to foster such relationships, Judge 
Posner says that the ALI’s current direction precludes useful collaboration 
among the different elements of the legal profession (36-40). However, some 
of those shortcomings could be reversed if the ALI were to initiate a project 
that focused specifically on judging and the role of judges.104 Indeed, Judge 
Posner, as an eminent member of the ALI, would make an excellent Reporter 
for such a project (39). 
As the preceding suggests, judicial education is fundamentally important 
to a well-functioning society, and Divergent Paths does an excellent job in 
highlighting a number of critical concerns from the U.S. perspective.  Francis 
Bacon once said, “Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend 
98. See id. at 10.
99. See armytage, supra note 6, at 164-93; Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
100. John Roberts, My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat, CNN (Sept. 12, 2005) 
(reproducing Chief Justice Roberts’ opening statement during his confirmation hearings), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/.
101. Individual judges can and do adopt extremely diverse philosophies of judging. See Fogel & 
Strong, supra note 7.
102. See Robert G. Bone, Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory, 2015 J. 
disp. resoL. 129, 129 (2015); Dawson, supra note 56, at 176-77; Strong, Judicial Education, supra 
note 7, at 19. 
103. Judge Posner says that the Sedona Conference provides an excellent model for bringing 
together judges and practicing lawyers. 
104. See ameriCan LaW institute, Project Life Cycle, https://www.ali.org/projects/project-life-cycle/.
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than plausible, and more advised than confident.”105 Fortunately, Judge 
Posner’s most recent contribution to the legal literature provides an excellent 
guide on how to achieve these goals.
105. franCis baCon, tHe pHiLosopHiCaL Works of franCis baCon 802 (John M. Robertson 
ed., 1905).
